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Abstract
The vulnerability of traditional blockchains have been demon-
strated at multiple occasions. Various companies are now
moving towards Proof-of-Authority (PoA) blockchains with
more conventional Byzantine fault tolerance, where a known
set of n permissioned sealers among which no more than t are
Byzantine seal blocks that include user transactions. Despite
their wide adoption, these protocols were not proved correct.
In this paper, we present the Cloning Attack against the two
mostly deployed PoA implementations of Ethereum, namely
Aura and Clique. The Cloning Attack consists in one sealer
cloning its key-value pair into two distinct Ethereum instances
that communicate with distinct groups of sealers. To identify
their vulnerabilities, we first specified the corresponding al-
gorithms. We then infer the topology of the largest PoA net-
work, POA Core, through active measurement. We deploy
one testnet for each protocol and demonstrate the success of
the attack with only one byzantine sealer. Finally, we pro-
pose counter-measures that prevent an adversary from double
spending.
1 Introduction
Ethereum is one of the most popular blockchain systems
thanks to the large ecosystem of distributed applications that it
executes. Unfortunately, the default Ethereum protocol based
on proof-of-work (PoW) can fork as it allows distinct blocks
to be appended at the same index of the chain. This fork-
ing situation can lead to security vulnerabilities, like double
spending, if it is not detected early enough [17, 28, 29]. Al-
ternative protocols, called proof-of-authority (PoA) protocols,
that aim at avoiding forks have recently been integrated in
the most widely deployed versions of Ethereum, parity and
geth, and are currently used world-wide. PoA has become rap-
idly popular and is now distributed through major Software-
as-a-Service providers and used in several blockchain net-
works [3, 6, 39]. Yet, to our knowledge, the level of security
offered by PoA protocols has not been properly assessed.
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Figure 1: Topology of sealers in the POA Core network
These PoA consensus protocols, called Aura and Clique,
are said to use a proof-of-authority because they restrict the
creation of a block to a fixed set of n authority nodes, called
sealers, among which a maximum of t < n2 can misbehave or
be Byzantine. They aim at solving the well-known Byzantine
consensus problem [32], where among n nodes the honest
ones agree on a unique block despite the presence of t < n2
Byzantine nodes. PoA gives the sealers the authority to seal a
block, which consists of signing cryptographically the block.
This set of sealers can possibly change over time if a subset of
the participants allow it, hence being well suited for dynamic
consortia of participants. PoA is an appealing solution for
critical industries with security requirements.
For these reasons, PoA recently gained rapid momentum in
critical applications [3, 39]. Industry, such as Lavaa, propose
a tracking service to prevent fraud counterfeiting on top of
Aura [39]. Microsoft describes how to deploy Aura “in pro-
duction” [13]. Amazon Web Services offers PoA through the
Clique protocol built in geth to its customers [23]. They im-
plemented a service that aims at maintaining data privacy and
integrity in a multi-tenant scenario. Every day, Internet users
exchange digital assets through multiple instances of these
two protocols. Huawei uses the Apla blockchain platforms
based on PoA to develop smart transportation by coupling IoT
with blockchain in supply chains and logistics [4]. Rinkeby is
a network of 65 participants offering the Clique service across
four continents to its users [34]. The xDai DPOS network
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uses an Ethereum 1.0 sidechain based on the Aura consensus
protocol to transfer assets [3]. Sokol and Kovan are other
Ethereum testnets running the Aura protocol [19].
In particular, Sokol is used to test features before launch-
ing them on one of the largest in-production networks called
POA Core. Figure 1 illustrates the sealers topology of POA
Core that we inferred through active measurements and sealer
fingerprinting (cf. Section 8 for details). An interesting the-
oretical work by De Angelis et al. [2] indicated that the con-
sistency of Aura can be limited, for example if the clocks
are far apart, and that Clique is eventually consistent. To the
best of our knowledge, these algorithms have not been form-
alized and it is unclear whether an attacker could violate data
integrity.
In this paper, we show that, under its required conditions,
PoA is not secure even under its required conditions: when
a sufficiently large set V of sealers among n of them must
seal a block despite a minority t of them being malicious.
To this end, we design, implement and experiment an attack,
called the Cloning Attack, against both Ethereum’s Aura and
Clique consensus protocols that allows us to steal digital as-
sets. Our findings inspired by the theory of Byzantine fault
tolerance defines precisely the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions n+t2 < |V |< n− t under which PoA can be safe and
live.
The Cloning Attack consists of a sealer attacker cloning
a private key to convince half of the honest sealers that
a transaction is correctly committed before erasing this
transaction to double spend its coins. Thanks to the cloning,
to convince half of the honest sealers that transactions are
committed, the attacker simply needs to delay messages
between two halves of honest sealers. Note that this is
achieved without knowing the precise locations of sealers but
simply through OS and network fingerprinting that allows
to identify the autonomous systems the sealers belong to. In
the POA Core example depicted in Figure 1, it is sufficient
for an Amazon sealer to clone itself on Azure and leverage a
30 second message delay between AWS and the rest of the
network to commit conflicting transactions and double spend.
Responsible disclosure: For ethical reasons, we previously
communicated the vulnerability we present here to (i) the
security team of Parity Technology, (ii) the Ethereum bug
bounty team at bounty@ethereum.org and (iii) during a non-
published presentation at an Ethereum development con-
ference (not revealed here for the sake of anonymity). As
a result, both security teams acknowledged the possibility
of the attack and the xDai blockchain of the POSDAO pro-
ject is currently implementing one of the counter-measures
of Section 10.3 at https://github.com/poanetwork/
parity-ethereum/pull/109 as acknowledged in their
white paper [3].
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the Cloning attack by
double spending in two testnets, one running parity and the
other running geth. The application of the Cloning attack
to Aura is slower as it consists of the attacker sealing more
blocks in one branch while its application to Clique is faster
but more subtle as it consists of the attacker disordering the
victim sealers to minimize the weight of a branch. Overall,
we found that Aura required less topological knowledge than
Clique for a malicious sealer to achieve double spending with
100% success rate. The attack against Clique is about twice
faster than Aura’s but its success rate ranges from 60% to
100%. In order to remedy the identified vulnerabilities, we
propose to modify these two PoA protocols to preserve their
safety. Even though our counter-measures introduce liveness
limitations in these algorithms they make them more suitable
for critical applications.
Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 describes the
model. Section 4 formalizes both Aura and Clique protocols
as implemented in respectively parity and geth. Section 5 de-
scribes the Cloning Attack against both consensus algorithms.
Sections 6 and 7 explain how to exploit it to double spend
in Aura and Clique, respectively. Section 8 indicates how we
inferred the necessary topological information of the currently
running POA Core network. We then present in Section 9 our
evaluation of the Cloning Attack on both protocols, while Sec-
tion 10 discusses our results and potential countermeasures.
Section 11 concludes the paper.
2 Background
Most of the known double spending attacks against block-
chains exploit their inherent permissionless mechanism by
including in the blockchain a transaction that transfers coins
and then discards this transaction, hence allowing to re-spend
the previously spent coins in a subsequent transaction. Below
we list some of these attacks to explain the recent raise of
alternative protocols based on PoA.
Perhaps the most conventional way to double spend in
permissionless blockchains is for an attacker to exploit more
than half of the mining power of the system to create a heavier
or longer branch that can overwrite transactions that were
expected to be sufficiently confirmed or committed [35]. In
some blockchains, a quarter of the mining power appears
enough in theory to attract participants into a coalition whose
cumulative mining power reaches strictly more than half of
the total mining power [14]. SMARTPOOL [25] copes with
the centralisation of mining power into these blockchains and
the risk of mining pools to join a coalition of strictly more
than half of the total mining power.
To attack permissionless blockchains without a significant
mining power, researchers attacked the network. The Eclipse
attack against Bitcoin [17] consists of isolating at the IP layer
a victim miner from the rest of the network to exploit its
resources. The Blockchain Anomaly [27] exploits message
reordering in Ethereum to abort transactions that seemed
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sufficiently confirmed. The Balance Attack [28] partitions
the network into groups of similar mining power to influence
the selection of the canonical chain. Recently, actual man-
in-the-middle attacks were run to demonstrate the feasibility
of stealing assets in Ethereum without a significant mining
power [11].
To cope with these attacks, some modern blockchains build
upon Byzantine agreement [32]. sometimes probabilistic-
ally [16, 26], sometimes deterministically [20, 38]. Building
upon the long Byzantine agreement literature, we know that
when the network is synchronous and messages are delivered
in a known bounded time, then t < n3 is sufficient to reach con-
sensus. If one also assumes authentication, then even t < n2
becomes sufficient [22]. What is key for critical applications
is that these Byzantine fault tolerant blockchains guarantee
that no participants double spend even when messages get
unexpectedly delayed. Unfortunately, it is impossible to reach
consensus when message delays are unbounded [15].
Proof-of-Authority (PoA) was recently proposed as a Byz-
antine fault tolerant consensus mechanism that integrates with
the Ethereum protocol [18]. The Ethereum geth software of-
fers two different PoA consensus protocol, called Clique and
Istanbul BFT [24] whereas the Ethereum parity offers the
PoA consensus protocol, called Aura. The concept is similar
to traditional Byzantine fault tolerant consensus in that only
n sealers are permissioned to create new blocks but requires
authentication and strictly less than n2 Byzantine participants,
similarly to the seminal work on Byzantine consensus [22].
Although it does not necessarily improve the protocol per-
formance, the supposed lack of double spending of PoA raised
interest from the industry [3, 6, 39]. However, some work re-
cently questions the consistency of PoA [2, 36, 37]. In par-
ticular, it was found that unsynchronized clocks could affect
Aura’s consistency whereas Clique was only eventually con-
sistent [2], however, no attacks against Aura or Clique have
been proposed. Another work [37] mentioned that an attacker
could maintain two chains of equal lengths. To be possible,
this requires the attacker to falsify block timestamps to violate
the policy that new blocks are appended to the branch whose
latest block has the earliest timestamp among all branches. It
turns out, however, that such a violation can be easily detected
by other sealers verifying timestamp or header of the blocks.
This is probably why the developers did not change the code
to remedy this, as the authors mentioned in their paper.
Our cloning idea shares similarities with the idea to attack
a distributed system by falsifying identities that was already
discussed in the past. The Sybil Attack [9] presents the attack
against peer-to-peer systems by forging multiple identities.
By contrast, the Cloning Attack consists of replicating the
machines using the same identity rather than forging identities.
More specifically, the Cloning Attack leverages the fact that
Ethereum accepts two different machines located at different
ends of the network to use the same private key.
3 Model
We consider a distributed system of n permissioned sealers
whose identifiers are p1, .., pn ∈ Ids. As the blockchain is
open, it accepts the requests issued by nodes or processes
that are not necessarily sealers, hence the overall number
of participants can be larger than n, but only n participants
can propose blocks and seal (or sign) them. We assume au-
thentication through a public-key cryptosystem that allows
participants to easily identify that a block is correctly signed
by a sealer so that incorrectly signed blocks are simply ig-
nored. We assume that keys cannot be forged or stolen by
Byzantine participants and that appropriate private keys are
correctly distributed to the sealers initially. As in the Dolev-
Yao model [8], we assume the attacker, who has the control
over the Byzantine participants, can intercept messages.
It is claimed that the Aura algorithm is designed to “tolerate
up to 50% of malicious nodes” [18], however, in general a
participant cannot decide if half of the nodes pretend that a
block is decided while the other half of the nodes pretend that
the same block is not decided [22]. This is the reason why we
assume in this paper that no more than t < n2 participants can
be Byzantine and can act in an arbitrary way, hence a majority
of participants always remain honest.
As it is well known that consensus cannot be reached in
an environment where communication is asynchronous in the
presence of faults, it appears natural to assume additional syn-
chrony. It is unclear whether PoA protocols can be safe under
partial synchrony, where message gets delivered in a bounded
amount of time that is not known from the algorithm [10]
or how long communication can take for these protocols to
work. As an example, a preliminary version of Aura was men-
tioned to require synchrony in a web document [31], however,
this information appears outdated as the implementation is
closer to another documentation [18] that does not mention
this assumption, as we explain in Section 4.1.
The questions we investigate is whether PoA protocols
work under partial synchrony, and if not, whether the risk of
unexpected message delays is benign (liveness or termina-
tion of the consensus is not guaranteed but safety remains
guaranteed in that no double spending occur) or can have dra-
matic consequences (disagreement can occur), hence letting
an attacker double spend. As we will explain, our conclu-
sion is that PoA protocols do not work in that even safety is
not guaranteed but some countermeasures can remedy this
problem.
4 PoA Consensus Algorithms
In this section we describe the two main variants of PoA al-
gorithms, called Aura and Clique, implemented in the predom-
inant Ethereum software, called parity and geth, respectively.
We first formalize two distinct versions of the Aura algorithm
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that are both publicly available online. We then formalize the
Clique algorithm.
4.1 The Aura consensus algorithms
There exist two distinct versions of the Aura algorithm as
documented online, one that corresponds to the current parity
implementation of the Ethereum protocol and another [18]
that uses rounds to decide whether a consensus decision is
reached.
4.1.1 The parity Aura algorithm
Algorithm 1 depicts the way Aura guarantees that parti-
cipating nodes reach consensus on the uniqueness of the
block at a given index of the blockchain as implemented
in Parity-Ethereum-v2.0.8 (v2.0.8 was the latest version at
the time we performed our experiments). Every participating
node maintains a state comprising a set of sealers, its current
view of the blockchain ci as a directed acyclic graph 〈Bi,Pi〉,
a block b with fields parent that links to the parent block, a
sealer and a step indicating the time at which the block is
added to the blockchain, as explained below. Initially, they
are ⊥ meaning “undefined”.
Algorithm 1 The parity Aura algorithm at process pi
1: State:
2: sealers⊆ Ids, the set of sealers
3: ci = 〈Bi,Pi〉, the local blockchain at node pi is a directed
4: acyclic graph of blocks Bi and pointers Pi
5: b, a block record with fields:
6: parent, the block preceding b in the chain, initially ⊥
7: sealer, the sealer that signed block b, initially ⊥
8: step, the blockchain step when the block gets added, initially ⊥
9: step-duration, the duration of each step as configured
10:
11: propose()i:  sealers keep proposing
12: while true do  infinite loop
13: step← clock-time()/step-duration  discretize time
14: if i ∈ sealers∧ stepmod |sealers|= i) then  my turn
15: b.parent← last-block(ci)  link a block
16: b.sealer← pi  seal the block
17: ci← 〈Bi ∪{b},Pi ∪{b.parent}〉  update local view
18: broadcast(ci)  send blocks
19: sleep(step-duration)  wait before looping
20:
21: score(〈B j,Pj〉):  compute the score of a branch
22: return UINT128_MAX×height(〈B j,Pj〉)− step-num(〈B j,Pj〉)
23:
24: deliver(〈B j,Pj〉)i:
25: if score(〈B j,Pj〉)> score(〈Bi,Pi〉) then
26: 〈Bi,Pi〉 ← 〈B j,Pj〉  select the right branch in case of forks
27:
28: is-decided(b)i:
29: V←{bk.sealer | bk ∈ Bi;k ≥ i}  sealers in blocks since bi
30: return (|V|×2> |sealers|)  more than majority of sealers signed
The function propose() is invoked in order to propose a
block for a particular index of the blockchain. The consensus
is reached once the block is decided, which can happen much
later as we will explain in the function is-decided() (line 28)
below. The algorithm discretises time into steps that corres-
ponds to consecutive periods of step-duration time, as spe-
cified in a configuration file. Each sealer executes an infinite
loop that periodically checks whether the clock-time() indic-
ates that this is its turn to propose a block (line 13). When it
is its turn (line 14), a sealer sets the parent of the block to the
last block of its view and signs it (line 36).
Each broadcast() invoked by the propose() function sends
blocks that get delivered to all other participating nodes that
are honest (in reality only the last block is broadcast unless
some sealer is unaware of more blocks). The deliver() func-
tion (line 24) is thus invoked at each honest participating
node, regardless of whether it is a sealer, upon reception of
the broadcast message. Once a blockchain view is delivered
to pi, the node compares the score of the blockchain view it
maintains to the blockchain view it receives, using the score
(line 21). The highest blockchain has the greatest score, how-
ever, if two blockchains share the same height, then the one
that is denser in terms of its number of non-empty slots ob-
tains the highest score. This is indicated by the two functions
height and step-num that represent the height of the block-
chain and the number of slots for which there exists a block
in the blockchain.
4.1.2 Round-based variant of the Aura algorithm
The Aura algorithm implemented in parity is not the only
algorithm called, Aura. Another variant is presented in the
PoA Network white paper available online [18]. Algorithm 2
presents the different decision technique of this variant, the
rest of the pseudocode being identical to Algorithm 1.
In order to know whether a block b is decided at the end of a
successful consensus (Algo 2, line 1), a participant simply has
to check whether there exist two consecutive rounds round1
and round2 following block b, in each of which the blocks
are sealed by a majority of the sealers.
Algorithm 2 The round-based variant of Aura at process pi
1: is-decided(b)i:
2: `← |sealers|  number of validators
3: round1← (b.step,b.step+ `]  steps in next round
4: round2← (b.step+ `,b.step+2∗ `]  steps in the 2nd next round
5: maj1← |{b′ : b′.step ∈ round1}|> `/2  majority in round 1
6: maj2← |{b′′ : b′′.step ∈ round2}|> `/2  majority in round 1
7: return (maj1∧maj2)  decided if majority in both rounds
Note that while presented in some documentation, this al-
ternative Aura specification is not the one used by the main-
stream implementation of the protocol. The current definition
of the Aura algorithm disregards the rounds and simply re-
quires enough blocks to be sealed [31]. Although the version
of Aura we experiment in this paper is the mainstream one
(Algorithm 1), the attack we present in Section 6 also applies
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to this more restrictive definition presented in Algorithm 2.
4.2 The Clique consensus algorithm
Algorithm 3 depicts the pseudocode of the Clique consensus
algorithm. It is the one used currently in geth-1.8.20-stable.
Every participating node shares the same initial block,
the genesis block, which also contains the block-period, the
period between consecutive block creations. Similarly to the
Aura protocol, each node maintains its own view of the grow-
ing blockchain ci as a directed acyclic graph 〈Bi,Pi〉. A block
b contains a number as an index of the block in the block-
chain, a weight as a weight of the block, a parent field that
links to its parent block and a sealer.
The propose() function runs an infinite loop in order to
propose blocks to the blockchain when certain conditions are
satisfied. The first condition (line 26) requires the process
to wait for blocks from other sealers until none of the last
sealer-limit blocks contains its signature. In the current imple-
mentation the sealer-limit must be b|sealers|/2c+ 1, which
is the smallest majority. As a result of this first condition,
sealers need to take turn to sign blocks. The second condition
(line 28) is to wait for block-period.1 When both conditions
are met, the process checks if it is its turn to sign the block
(line 29). The process may sign a block right away withweight
equal to 2; otherwise, it may sign a block with weight equal to
1 after a random delay between 0 and 500×b|sealers|/2c+1
milliseconds (line 32). The consensus is reached once the
block is decided later as we will describe in the function
is-decided() (line 47). The last step in the loop, broadcast(),
sends messages to other participants.
Upon reception of the broadcast message, the deliver()
function (line 43) is invoked at each participating node re-
gardless of whether it is a sealer. The total-weight function
(line 40) used by the process compares the weight between
two blockchain views, a current blockchain that it maintains
locally and the one freshly received. The process updates its
local view if the received blockchain is heavier; otherwise it
keeps the same local blockchain view.
To consider whether a block b is decided (line 47), a process
has to check the set of sealers who sign blocks after b. Only
when a majority of sealers have appended subsequent blocks
to the chain, can a block be considered decided.
5 The Cloning Attack
In this section, we present the cloning attack to double spend
in PoA blockchains. In particular, we present the common-
alities between the attacks against Aura and Clique, namely
the cloning process that allows an attacker to play different
roles in the blockchain, the majority that allows two groups
1The default block-period is 15 seconds as developers suggest the same
duration to remain analogous to the proof-of-work blockchain Ethereum.
Algorithm 3 The geth Clique algorithm at process pi
1: State:
2: sealers⊆ Ids, the set of sealers
3: ci = 〈Bi,Pi〉, the local blockchain at node pi is a directed
4: acyclic graph of blocks Bi and pointers Pi
5: b, a block record with fields:
6: parent, the block preceding b in the chain, initially ⊥
7: sealer, the sealer that signed block b, initially ⊥
8: number, the index of the block in the chain, initially ⊥
9: weight, the weight of a block, initially ⊥
10: block-period, minimum duration in second between timestamps of
11: two consecutive blocks, initially 5 seconds
12: majority, the number of b |sealers|2 c+1
13: sealer-limit, max. number of consecutive blocks among which a
sealer
14: can sign at most one block, initially set to the majority
15:
16: sign-recently(ci,n)i:
17: λ← sealer-limit
18: ret = false
19: for m= n−λ, ...,n do  loop through last λ blocks
20: if bm.number mod |sealers|= i then ret = true
21: return ret
22:
23: propose()i:
24: while true do
25: n← last-block(ci).number  last block index
26: wait until ¬sign-recently(ci,n)  wait until I can seal a block
27: T← get-last-timestamp(ci)
28: wait until clock≥ T +block-period  wait ≥ block-period
29: if (n+1)mod |sealers|= i then  in-order sealing
30: b.weight = 2  block weight 2
31: else  out-of-order sealing
32: sleep(rand([0,500×majority])ms)  random delay in millisecs
33: b.weight = 1  block weight 1
34: b.number = n+1  increment block index
35: b.parent← last-block(ci)  link a block
36: b.sealer← sign()  seal the block
37: ci← 〈Bi ∪{b},Pi ∪{b.parent}〉  update local view
38: broadcast(ci)  send blocks
39:
40: total-weight(〈B j,Pj〉)i:  total weight
41: return ∑b.weight|b ∈ Bj
42:
43: deliver(〈B j,Pj〉)i:
44: if total-weight(〈B j,Pj〉)> total-weight(〈Bi,Pi〉) then  heaviest
45: 〈Bi,Pi〉 ← 〈B j,Pj〉
46:
47: is-decided(b)i:
48: V←{bk.sealer : bk ∈ B;k ≥ i}  sealers in blocks since bi
49: return |V|>majority  more than majority of sealers signed
of sealers to make progress without the other, and the way
transactions should conflict to double spend. The difference in
how these attacks are applied to Aura and Clique are deferred
to Sections 6 and 7, respectively.
By assumption, only a minority of the sealers can be ma-
licious, this is the reason why PoA algorithms require a ma-
jority of sealed blocks to consider whether a block and its
transactions appear to be committed. Intuitively, this should
prevent the malicious sealers to form a coalition that can
double spend. In reality, as we explain below, (2− (n mod 2))
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attacker(s) cloning their own instance into two clones are
sufficient to double spend.
5.1 Cloning instances by duplicating keys
The first step necessary in the Cloning Attack is for some
attacker to duplicate its Ethereum instance into two clones.
Cloning consists for a single user of running two instances
of the Ethereum protocol with the same address or public-
private key pair. Note that these two instances could run either
on the same machine, using the same IP address, or on dis-
tinct machines with distinct IP addresses. We call these two
instances clones because one has the same information as the
other before messages start being delayed. In addition, during
the whole duration of the attack, both clones use the same
public-private key pair. Interestingly, we noted that Ethereum
allows these two cloned instances to both create blocks, how-
ever, as they use the same private key to seal blocks, they are
considered to act as a unique sealer.
At some point, the attacker exploits message delays (either
accidental or as a result of a network attack) between two
groups of a minority of dn/2e− 1 sealers, hence creating a
transient partition. At this moment, the two clones may not
share exactly the same database content as they may not be
aware of the exact same blocks that are present in the block-
chain. To maintain the cloning at the start of the partition, the
attacker copies the content of the blockchain database of one
of the clones to the database of the other clone and connects
each of these clones to a different partition. During the time
of this partition, the Ethereum protocol readjusts the peering
so that sealers within the same group keep communicating.
Note that they are various ways of obtaining a partition in
the Ethereum network either by misconfiguring routes, lever-
aging natural disasters or maliciously attacking the network.
One example of a network attack that allows to partition the
Internet is the BGP hijacking attack. It works by having an
attacker advertising to one group wrong routes that reach the
other group in order to intercept all traffic between the two
groups. Once the traffic is rerouted, the attacker can simply
delay the propagation of messages. We refer the interested
reader to existing ways of implementing man-in-the-middle
attacks in Ethereum [11].
5.2 Majority groups to guarantee progress
Clones are exploited in the attack to give the illusion to honest
sealers that each group contains a majority of sealers. In order
to progress towards a double spending situation, each group
must commit transactions and thus decide blocks, this is why
we need (2− (n mod 2)) attackers that clone instances:
• Case n is odd. The honest sealers can be split into two
groups of (n−1)/2 sealers, each representing a minority.
In order to guarantee progress of the protocol on both
sides of the partition, a single attacker can simply add
one clone in each minority, hence reaching a majority of
bn/2c+1 sealers on each side. This is the reason why
(2− (n mod 2)) = 1 attacker is sufficient when n is odd.
• Case n is even. A single attacker could split the n− 1
honest sealers into two groups of different sizes, one that
contains n/2 sealers and another that contains n/2−1
sealers. It would however be insufficient to include a
clone in the second group to guarantee its progress. This
is why (2− (n mod 2)) = 2 attackers are needed.
To conclude, the (2− (n mod 2)) attacker(s) thus parti-
tion(s) a network of n sealers into roughly two halves to
which they add clones so that each group contains a majority
of at least bn/2c+ 1 sealers. This guarantees the progress
of the protocol on each group so as to obtain the commit
of a transaction TX1 on one group and the canonical chain
containing TX2 in the other group. For example, there must
be at least 5 sealers in each subgroup for a network of n= 9
sealers. Such a condition is required to ensure termination of
the consensus algorithm, so that blocks will be decided, or
appear to be final, from the viewpoint of both subgroups.
Note that we consider here the necessary time for a partition.
In a realistic scenario, the attacker may want the effect of its
transaction to take occur before stopping the partition. For
example, an attacker buying a good in transaction TX1 may
want to receive the good before the transaction gets discarded
from the blockchain.
5.3 Conflicting transactions
The most common way of executing a double spending is
to make sure a transaction TX1 ends up being included in
one branch of a fork, then convincing the recipient that TX1
is committed, before resolving the fork by discarding the
branch of this transaction TX1. Later on, the sender of the
transaction TX1 can simply reuse the coins he initially spent
in TX1 in another transaction TX2. Interestingly in Ethereum,
if the conflicting transaction TX2 is not issued early enough,
then TX1 could be re-included in a mempool and committed
later on.
The goal is for the clones to leverage the message delays
between network partitions to rapidly issue two conflicting
transactions. As soon as the blockchain network is divided
into two subgroups, the attacker issues a minimum of two
conflicting transactions, at least one transaction to each sub-
group. A typical example to illustrate the double spending
attack is two conflicting transactions:
TX1 where Alice gives all her coins to Bob in the first
transaction sent to one group and
TX2 where Alice gives all her coins to Carol on the other
transaction sent to the other group.
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It is clear that committing both transactions would violate
the integrity of Alice’s account and would result in a double
spending. Once the first transaction appears committed, deliv-
ering the delayed messages or ending the partition will have
the effect of discarding one of the two transactions.
In the next two sections, we explain how the majority of
sealers in Aura and the order of the sealings in Clique allow
to select the transaction to be discarded by the system.
6 The Cloning Attack Against Aura
We now present a simple way to apply the Cloning attack to
double spend in Aura. To discard the branch, say the victim
branch, that contains TX1 and double spend, the attacker must
influence Aura to select the branch containing TX2, say the
attacker branch, as the canonical chain.
As explained earlier in Algorithm 1, the current imple-
mentation of Aura simply chooses the longest chain as the
canonical chain whenever a fork is detected. So, to influence
the selection of the attacker branch as the canonical chain,
the attacker simply has to contribute to the attacker branch
by sealing more blocks in the group maintaining this branch
than the other group.
Sealer 1 Sealer 3 Sealer 7 Sealer 9Sealer 5
Sealer 1Sealer 2 Sealer 6 Sealer 8Sealer 4
TX1
TX2
A block sealed
by a malicious
sealer
A block sealed by
a well-behaved
sealer
An empty turn
Well-behaved
sealer sealer
Malicious
Figure 2: Applying the cloning attack to double spend in Aura
requires the attacker, “Sealer 1”, to delay messages during
(n+1)× s seconds for transaction TX1 to be committed on
the upper branch and for the attacker to seal more blocks on
the lower branch than on the upper branch
To seal more blocks in one branch than another, the attacker
maintains the partition during (n+ 1)× s seconds, where n
is the number of sealers and s is the step duration in seconds
that separates consecutive blocks. The reason is twofold.
• First, as mentioned earlier in Algorithm 1, Aura requires
ns delay after a block is created to ensure that it is de-
cided. Deciding a block on the victim side is necessary
to make sure that TX1 gets committed. Given that both
the size of the group on each side is bn/2c+1 and that
each sealer seals one after another, the attacker clone
must also seal at least one block.
• Second, the attacker must ensure that the attacker branch
is longer than the victim branch so that the attacker
branch gets selected by Aura as the canonical branch.
This can only be done if the attacker seals two blocks on
the attacker branch, i.e., one extra block compared to the
number of blocks it sealed on the victim side. As a result,
the attacker needs to maintain the network partition for
(n+1)× s seconds to get at least two turns in which it
can seal a block.
Example with 9 sealers For the sake of simplicity, Figure 2
depicts the cloning attack against Aura with a network parti-
tion where there are n= 9 sealers and where 2−n mod 2 = 1
sealer is malicious, namely “Sealer 1”. This attacker is thus
present in both groups through its two cloned instances and
gives the illusion that each group contains a majority of
bn/2c+1 = 5 sealers while one of the sealers in each group
is actually a clone. As we can see, this attack translates into
having Sealer 1 creating the last block (depicted with the red
right-most block in the figure) only on the lower partition be-
fore merging the two partitions. By doing so, Sealer 1 makes
sure that this branch will be the canonical branch whereas the
upper branch will disappear. The attacker is thus guaranteed
to double spend successfully.
7 The Cloning Attack Against Clique
In this section, we apply the cloning attack against Clique.
In Clique, the Cloning Attack does not require to take as
long as in Aura. Unlike in Aura, a sealer of Clique can seal
a block even when it is not its turn. Depending on their turn,
some sealers may have to wait while others do not. These
differences impact the way the attacker can influence the
selection of one branch of a fork as the canonical chain and
allow an attacker to double spend faster than in Aura.
7.1 In-order and out-of-order sealers
The cloning attack against Clique differs from the one against
Aura in the moment at which it starts delaying messages. Be-
cause the order of sealing is important in Clique, the attacker
should ideally decide to start delaying the messages based on
the sealer’s turn to seal a block.
When a sealer seals a block while it is his turn, we call
this sealer an in-order sealer and the block an in-order block
(cf. Alg. 3, Line 29). There is at most one in-order sealer to
seal the current block in each partition of Clique. When a
sealer seals a block while it is not his turn, we call this sealer
an out-of-order sealer and this block an out-of-order block
(cf. Alg. 3, Line 32). As a sealer must wait for sealer-limit
blocks between two blocks it seals, there are at most (n−
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Figure 3: An execution of the in-order cloning attack against
Clique where n= 9 sealers mine the blue blocks in-turn before
the messages get delayed, after which each group seals five
blocks, 3 in-order blocks on the left group and 1 in-order
block on the right group
sealer-limit) potential out-of-order sealers to seal a block.
The in-order block contributes a weight of 2 to the weight of
its branch whereas the out-of-order blocks contribute to 1 to
the weight of its branch, hence sealing in-order or out-of-order
impacts the decision regarding the branch selection process.
In addition, an in-order sealer can append a block to the
chain without waiting for any delay as shown in Line 29
of Alg. 3. By contrast, an out-of-order sealer has to wait
for a random period as indicated at Line 32 of Alg. 3. This
mechanism gives the in-order sealer some time to be the first
to seal a block in his turn, but allows out-of-order sealers to
seal a block if the in-order sealer is lagging.
As the canonical chain is chosen among the branches of a
fork by comparing the sum of their block weights, the attacker
must have a maximum number of in-order sealers at the time
of the partition to maximize the overall weight. Hence, to
influence the selection of the branch as the canonical chain,
the attacker must choose the proper turn to start delaying mes-
sages. If not done properly, the attacker risks to maximizing
the weight of the branch where its transaction was included,
limiting the chances of a successful double spending.
7.2 Disordering sealers to select a branch
Figure 3 depicts the execution of the attack with n= 9 sealers
and one attacker (Sealer 1) as time increases from top to bot-
tom. Initially, the blockchain starts with block 5, indicating
that the first block is sealed by Sealer 5. As times goes on,
Sealers 6, 7, 8 and 9, seal one after the other the subsequent
blocks of the blockchain. As there is no partition yet, the
in-order sealers are the first to sign these blocks during their
respective turn, hence all blocks are in-order blocks represen-
ted in blue in the figure. Next to each created block is a list of
sealers that are either unable to seal (grey), in-order sealers
(green) or out-of-order sealers (yellow).
Consider that Sealer 1, the attacker, performs the cloning
and delays the network messages. Right after Sealer 9 sealed
his block, Sealer 1 starts intercepting the messages between
the group of sealers 2, 3, 4 and 5 on the left side and the group
of sealers 6, 7, 8 and 9 on the right side. Note that Sealer 1
is represented on both sides because of the presence of one
of its clones on each side. The resulting partition is indicated
in Figure 3 with a fork of the blockchain into two branches.
Right after the partition starts, Sealer 1 issues two conflicting
transactions TX1 and TX2 on each side of the partition that will
double spend. The two clones of Sealer 1 allow him to seal
one block in each group. Note that these blocks are labelled 1
and represented in blue because Sealer 1 is the in-order sealer
at this point in time. After sealing, Sealer 1 is no longer able
to seal any block due to the sealer-limit, hence Sealer 1 is
depicted in grey in both groups.
On the right side of the partition, we can see that Sealer 6
seals the following block, even though it is not the in-order
sealer at this moment. This is because the in-order sealer,
Sealer 2, cannot communicate with this group as the network
is partitioned. For some reason it might also be the case on
the left side of the partition that Sealer 2 is not fast enough
to seal the next block and that another sealer, say Sealer 3,
manages to seal it before. Note that this can happen as the
delay Sealer 3 has to wait before sealing is a random number
that can be null (cf. Alg. 3, Line 32). However, this last seal
from Sealer 3 prevents it from sealing the next block in-order
as it has to wait for the sealer-limit, hence the next block is
again out-of-order. The process continues where sealers on
the left side seal in-order whereas sealers on the right side
seal out-of-order.
Finally, the attacker does no longer need to delay the mes-
sages and can stop the partition as both transactions TX1 and
TX2 are now successfully committed. In fact, the transactions
are both now in the first block of a series of bn/2c+ 1 = 5
consecutive blocks, which is sufficient for all Clique users to
consider these transactions as committed because their block
is decided as indicated at Line 49 of Algorithm 3. We can
conclude that the weight gained by the branch on the left side
during the partition is 3×2+2×1 = 8 because it contains
3 in-order blocks and 2 out-of-order blocks. By contrast, the
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weight gained by the branch on the right side during the parti-
tion is 1×2+4×1 = 6 because it contains 1 in-order block
and 4 out-of-order blocks. It follows from the difference in
weight of the two branches that the heaviest branch on the left
side is chosen as the canonical branch whereas the lightest
branch on the right side is simply discarded by the protocol
(cf. Alg. 3, Line 44).
7.3 Attack regardless of the order of sealers
Note that even if the attacker does not know the topology,
there is a way to attack Clique. The attack is slightly different
from the previous one as it relies on the possibility for the
attacker to become the only sealer able to seal a block on both
sides of the partition. The attacker can simply seal a single
block on the victim branch, and keep sealing blocks on the
attacker branch. In the worst case scenario for the attacker,
all the bn/2c+ 1 upcoming in-order sealers end up on the
victim side, which will maximize the weight of the branch
on the victim side gained during the partition. Recall that the
sealer-limit is always bn/2c+1 in Clique (Alg. 3, Line 14),
Now, if the attacker stops sealing a second block on the victim
side, then the maximum weight gained on this side during the
partition will be (sealer-limit×2). The attacker simply needs
to keep sealing on the other branch until the gained weight
on this branch reaches (sealer-limit×2+1). In this case, the
attacker successfully double spends regardless of the sealer
turn in each group.
8 Inferring the POA Core Topology
In this section, we show how to infer the topological informa-
tion necessary to run the Cloning attack against the currently
running POA Core network.
Since POA Core is a public blockchain, the network re-
quests its sealers to comply with some eligibility requirements
as part of an application procedure. First, all individuals run-
ning a sealer node must be US residents. Second, these indi-
viduals must deploy their Ethereum sealer instance within the
US. Third, a sealer candidate must be a public notary in the
US with a valid license. (Note that this is not a hard require-
ment for Sokol, but it is mandatory for POA Core.) Fourth,
sealer individuals must write, in a POA forum, posts about
themselves that often include their full name and their notary
public licenses. (This can then be used to retrieve their mail
addresses.)
To bootstrap the POA Core network, the first sealer of
a network called the “Master of Ceremony” generates the
initial keys and distributes them to a group of independent
participants. Together they form the first group of sealers that
govern the blockchain network. This governance may vote
for adding new sealers or removing existing ones to limit, for
example, bribery attacks. Before a new sealer candidate can
be eligible for a sealer role on POA Core, one needs to apply
a sealer role on Sokol, a testnet for POA Core, and actively
participate in its on-chain governance for some minimum
period of time.
Netstat information In addition to the public information
part of the sealer application, POA Core employs two monit-
oring tools that also publicizes information about its sealers.
For the public to be able to browse blockchain information
conveniently, POA Core has its own block explorer site [33],
which reveals the sealing order of all the active sealers as well
as the required time to seal one block. In order to monitor
the system and the network status of each sealer, POA Core
incorporates the netstat server within its own web-based dash-
board site [12] and displays the information received from all
participating sealers. Some of this information, including the
number of peers of each sealer, its OS names and its latency
allowed us to uniquely identify the sealer nodes.
Active measurement and fingerprinting In order to ob-
tain the versions of the parity protocol run by sealers, their
IP addresses, and their port numbers, we instrumented the
code of Ethereum parity and launched a new node particip-
ating in POA Core. Using the information gathered from the
public sources, we inferred the topology of the POA Core
network to delay message for the Cloning attack. We used
the OS names obtained from the netstat server dashboard in
order to guess the datacenters where the nodes are deployed.
Assuming the sealers reported correct information, the suffix
of the OS names reported to the netstat server indicates the
cloud provider where the node runs, for example aws indic-
ates Amazon Web Service while azure indicates Microsoft
Azure. The information gathered by our node from its peers
included non-sealer nodes such as boot nodes, so we elimin-
ated some of these non-sealer nodes by examining their port
numbers and software versions. For instance, it is trivial that
a node that runs Parity on tcp/21000 is not a sealer, as the
netstat dashboard indicates that all the sealers use tcp/30303.
Next, we simply extracted the autonomous system numbers
(used to route the Internet traffic globally) based on their list
of IP addresses. After that, we used nmap [30] to perform
network OS fingerprinting on a list of IP addresses that we
had already obtained. Although results from network OS fin-
gerprinting are not 100% accurate, it was sufficient to map
this information back to the OS names obtained from the
dashboard because the cloud providers often use different
kernel versions in their OS images. Finally, we estimated the
datacenters where sealers are deployed by looking at the prox-
imities between their actual addresses and locations of the
datacenters. Figure 1 summarizes the topological information
we gathered from this inference.
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9 Experiments
In this section, we present the double spending results of the
Cloning Attack in both Aura and Clique. For ethical reasons,
we do not experiment our attack against PoA networks that
are currently in production. Instead, we first present our ex-
perimental setup then detail the risk for an attacker to perform
double spending in both Aura and Clique within our network.
9.1 Testnet setup
To practically observe the chance of successful double spend-
ing using the approaches described in the previous sections we
have created our own PoA blockchain networks, experimented
the attacks and measured their success rate empirically.
Our testnet consists of 10 Ubuntu 18.04 Virtual Machines
(VMs) on our OpenStack private cloud; each VM is provided
with 1 virtual CPU core and 2 GB of memory. These VMs
are placed into two subnets, 5 VMs each; they are connected
through 5 linux virtual routers and a physical Ethernet switch
with dedicated VLAN. An instance of either Parity-Ethereum
2.0.8 stable version with Aura or go-ethereum 1.8.21 stable
version with Clique runs on each VM.
All of these instances are peering with each other to form
the blockchain network. While we have 10 Ethereum in-
stances in total, our PoA blockchain employed only 9 unique
private keys for sealers; the last instance instead uses the same
key as the first one as explained in Section 5 where one in-
stance is seen as a clone of the other. As of writing, neither
Aura nor Clique incorporate a mechanism to prevent private
key reusing. One can simply copy a key and configuration
files from one instance to another in order share the private
key, other instances will simply accept the connection from
the clone instance in the same way as the original.
In our experiments, the attacker is a Byzantine (or mali-
cious) sealer with the intention to achieve double spending.
This attacker is provided the capability to transiently partition
the network into two sealer groups: the attacker and the victim
group. We refer to the attacker group as the group of sealers
whose blocks sealed during the network partition are intended
to be adopted as a part of canonical chain, while we refer to
the victim group as the group of sealers whose sealed blocks
are intended to be discarded after the fork is resolved.
To grant the capability to partition the network, we allow
our attacker to cut the network connectivity between two
subnets using a firewall feature on the linux routers. Note that
the same result is achieved using a man-in-the-middle attack
though ARP-spoofing in a local area network or with BGP-
hijacking in other networks [11]. The attacker is also provided
the controllability over 2 Ethereum instances (2 VMs) that
share the same private key used to seal the blocks.
The attacker aims to partition the network right before
their turn to seal the block, where each sealer group must
contain one VM that is under the control of the attacker. To
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Figure 4: The success rate of double spending with the Clon-
ing Attack in Aura
begin the attack, our attacker actively checks the owner of
the current turn every 10 ms in order to partition the network
close to the right timing. Right after the network partition,
the attacker issues one transaction to each sealer group; these
two conflicting transactions TX1 and TX2, for example Alice
is giving all of her coins to Bob in TX1 and gives the same
coins to Carol in TX2.
After issuing the transactions, the network partition is main-
tained during a period that depends on which PoA algorithm
as explained below. When the fork is resolved at the end of
the network partition, we look at the resulting branch of the
fork which has been adopted as a canonical chain as well as
the status of transactions.
A double spending is considered successful only if:
1. A transaction issued to the victim group is committed
before the end of the network partition;
2. the blocks sealed by the attacker group during the fork
have been adopted as a part of the canonical chain after
the end of the partition; and
3. the resulting canonical chain does not contain a transac-
tion issued to the victim group.
9.2 Running the Cloning Attack against Aura
We experiment the Cloning Attack in Aura by varying the
step duration and network partition duration. We chose Step
durations 3, 5, and 7 seconds in order to observe their im-
pact of the minimum partition duration that makes the attack
successful.
We maintain the network partition to match the step dur-
ation in use, such that for example a 24, 27, and 30 second
partition duration corresponds respectively to the 8th, 9th and
10th step for a 3 second step duration, respectively. We di-
vide the sealers into two groups, such that apart from the two
attacker instances, the placement of the reminder sealers is
randomly but equally balanced between the two partitions.
We do ensure, however, that both groups have an equal num-
ber of instances, which is 5, and each group contains one of
two instances under the control of the attacker. The values
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Figure 5: The success rate of the Cloning Attack double spend-
ing in Clique as the duration of the network partition increases
and for different numbers of consecutive possible in-order
sealers
plotted for each combination of step duration and network
partition duration are the averages over 30 runs.
Figure 4 presents the double spending success rate of 3, 5
and 7 second step durations. In all three cases, the obtained
results show a similar trend. As expected, achieving a success-
ful double spending is impossible in all step durations at the
8th step or any earlier step, namely 24, 40 and 56 seconds for
3, 5, and 7 second step durations, respectively. Indeed, these
attempts fail because any attack attempt among these runs
could neither commit the transaction in the victim group nor
force the block sealed by the attacker group to be adopted as
a canonical chain when the network partition ends.
However, we can observe that as expected, the chances
of successful double spending at the 9th step falls within
the range between 50-60%. Even though both groups are
provided enough time to seal 5 blocks in order to commit the
transactions, the attacker still cannot force a particular branch
of the fork to be adopted. The variation at this point is due to
the randomness of Ethereum instance placement during our
experiment.
For all three step durations, at the 10th step and any step
thereafter, the attack is always successful (100% chances).
This is due to the attack technique in use that allows the
attacker to force a branch of the fork to be adopted. Overall,
we can see that a longer step duration requires a longer period
of network partition in order to achieve a successful double
spending, which confirms our expectations.
9.3 Running the Cloning Attack against
Clique
We experiment the Cloning Attack on Clique while vary-
ing the partition duration and the way sealers are distributed
between two partitions.
The variations in the sealer divisions are included in the
experiments in order to capture the changes in weight of each
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Figure 6: The average number of blocks created in Clique
depending on the partition duration and the sealer distribution
across partitions
branch as a result of the sealing sequences. In particular, we
experiment with the 4 sealer divisions presented below with
different number of consecutive sealers:
• 5 consecutive sealers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 in the attacker group
and 1, 6, 7, 8, 9 in the victim group;
• 4 consecutive sealers: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 in the attacker group
and 1, 5, 7, 8, 9 in the victim group;
• 3 consecutive sealers: 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 in the attacker group
and 1, 4, 5, 8, 9 in the victim group;
• 2 consecutive sealers: 1, 2, 4, 6, 8 in the attacker group
and 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 in the victim group.
The partition duration is based on the block duration in
use, which is fixed to 5 seconds in all our Clique experiments.
Since our testnet setup consists of 9 sealers in total, to commit
a transaction during a partitioning, at least 5 blocks must be
sealed in such a period. In the best case where 5 sealers could
seal 5 in-order blocks, the minimum duration required for
the attack to succeed is equal to 5×5 = 25 seconds. In other
cases where at least 1 out of 5 blocks is sealed out-of-order,
however, the required duration exceeds 25 seconds.
Based on our knowledge of the time necessary for the al-
gorithm to seal 5 blocks, we vary the duration from 24.8 to
28.0 seconds in an incremental step of 200 milliseconds. The
range of duration allows to take into account the random delay
of out-of-order sealers as shown in Algorithm 3 and yet to
capture the behavior of the system from the point where only
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Figure 7: The average weight gained in Clique depending
on the partition duration and the sealer distribution across
partitions
4 blocks can be sealed to the point where 5 blocks can be
sealed.
For each run we keep a record of whether the double spend-
ing was successful, which block was sealed by which sealer,
the weight gained during the partition for each fork, and the
number of blocks created during the network partition. The
values averaged over 50 runs are depicted in the charts for
each partition duration.
Figure 5 reveals the double spending success rate for the
four aforementioned sealer divisions while Figure 6 and Fig-
ure 7 show the number of sealed blocks and the weight gained
during the network partition, respectively. We observe that
the success rate in Figure 5, follows a similar trend for all of
4 grouping variations; the longer the partition duration, the
higher the chance of successful double spending.
The shortest partition duration value in the chart, 24.8
second, gives the lowest success rate regardless of the sealer
division. This low success rate for short duration can be ex-
plained by the number of blocks sealed during the network
partition. Indeed, due to the limited partition duration, the vic-
tim group is rarely able to seal five blocks during the network
partition as shown in Figure 6, thus a transaction issued by
the victim group could not be committed and the attack fails.
When the partition takes longer, we can see that the victim
group is able to seal five blocks.
When the partition duration is less or equal to 26 seconds,
there is no noticeable difference between the four different
sealer divisions. In the case of two consecutive possible in-
order sealers and when the partition duration is greater than 26
seconds, however, the success rate is lower than the other three
divisions. This phenomenon can be explained by the weight
gained during the network partition as shown in Figure 7.
In fact, in case of 2 consecutive possible in-order sealers,
the difference in weight gained between attacker and victim
branches becomes relatively low; this gap narrows with the
increase in the partition duration.
10 Analysis and countermeasures
We begin this section by comparing the vulnerabilities of
Aura and Clique to the Cloning Attack resulting from our
experiments in Section 9. Next, we analyse further the Aura
algorithm and discuss its implication to the blockchain safety
and liveness. Finally, we present potential countermeasures
against the Cloning Attack.
10.1 Comparison between Aura and Clique
In this section, we explain why the Cloning Attack against
Aura can always be successful whereas the Cloning Attack
against Clique is much faster but not always successful.
As detailed in Section 4, one of the main differences
between Aura and Clique resides in the predictability of the
sequence of sealers. In fact, in Aura the sequence is strictly
enforced whereas in Clique this sequence may change de-
pending on the difference between a random number and the
network communication delay. This slight algorithmic dif-
ference has however significant consequences on consensus
algorithms resilience to double spending attacks using our
proposed Cloning Attacks.
On the one hand and as we have demonstrated in Section 9,
due to its strict enforcement of sealing order, Aura is vul-
nerable to the Cloning Attack in case of network partition.
Performing the Cloning Attack against Aura, the attacker does
not need to know anything about the identity of the sealers
nor does it need to know their order. Thus, a malicious sealer
only needs to partition the overlay network using classical
network attacks such as BGP hijacking to succeed in double
spending with a 100% chance of success.
On the other hand, double spending without topology in-
formation on Clique is possible, but the attack against Clique
is about twice as fast as against Aura when the topology is
known. Indeed, as we have presented in Section 9, the know-
ledge of potential next in-order sealer greatly influences the
chance of double spending. When the attacker is capable of
isolating the next bn/2c+1 sealers, it is able to perform the
double spending attack with 100% success rate. On the op-
posite, the knowledge of only the next two in-order sealers
only guarantees a success rate of 60% maximum.
Interestingly, when considering the attacks against both
Aura and Clique without the knowledge of the topology, it
appears that attacking Clique can be even slower than attack-
ing Aura. The reason is that in the worst case scenario where
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Figure 8: Required number of sealers |V | to decide a block
depending on the number of malicious sealers t: Aura is safe
only when |V |> n+t2 , Aura is live only when |V |< n− t, so
Aura is both safe and live only when n+t2 < |V |< n− t.
all in-order sealers are on the victim side, the attacker will
have to obtain a branch that is twice as large as the victim
branch before it can double spend. Growing this branch would
take more time than executing the Cloning Attack on Aura.
But overall, even without knowledge of the topology both
Aura and Clique consensus algorithms are vulnerable to a
malicious sealer aiming at double spending.
10.2 Requirements to make Aura safe and live
Our attack violates the safety of Aura, in that it leads the sys-
tem to an undesirable state, where coins can be stolen.2 As
we explain here, this problem can be mitigated by simply in-
creasing the number of sealers |V | necessary to decide a block.
Determining |V | to ensure safety may however be insufficient,
as it does not ensure that the system makes progress, which
is a liveness problem. So we also explain how to choose |V |
to ensure that Aura is both safe and live. Changing |V | can
be easily achieved by modifying the boolean condition under
which a block is decided at line 30 of Algorithm 1.
Figure 8 depicts the relation between the desired fault
tolerance of the system and the number of sealers |V |
necessary to decide a block to ensure Aura’s safety. This
analysis is helpful as it allows us depending on the targeted
fault tolerance, to decide the minimal number of sealers that
are necessary to decide a block in a synchronous or partially
synchronous network so as to ensure that Aura is safe and
live. In particular, we consider two distinct cases, whether
the network communication is synchronous or partially
synchronous. The asynchronous case is ignored here as
2Safety (resp. liveness) is often referred to as the property of a system to
guarantee that "a bad thing will never happen" (resp. "a good thing eventually
happens") [1, 21].
consensus would be impossible in all interesting cases where
t > 0 [15].
Synchronous network. In the synchronous case, Aura’s
safety is guaranteed when |V | > t, which is represented by
the area above the orange dotted line |V |= t+1 in Figure 8.
In fact, to ensure that there exists a block sealed by an honest
sealer, one has to wait for the number of blocks sealed by dis-
tinct sealers to be greater than the total number of malicious
sealers, which requires the number of sealers |V | to exceed
the number t of malicious sealers.
• Case t = 0: When all the sealers are honest, |V |= 1 is
sufficient to consider finality of a block, i.e., the trans-
actions within a block can be considered committed
instantly because one may safely assume that a block
will be delivered to all the sealers in the known upper
bounded time.
• Case 0 < t < n: When there is at least one malicious
sealer, one must ensure that at least one honest sealer
has recently appended a block to the blockchain before
considering finality of its previous blocks because a ma-
licious sealer may violate the protocol by introducing a
malformed block or appending a block out-of-order.
• Case t = n: In this case, we can see that |V | should be
strictly greater than n, which is impossible by definition.
This illustrates that it is impossible for Aura to work
when t = n.
To conclude the highest fault tolerance t that Aura can
tolerate in a synchronous system is t = n− 1 by requiring
blocks from all the |V |= n sealers to decide a block.
Partially synchronous network. Requiring b n2c+1 sealers
to decide one block is insufficient to tolerate unpredictable
message delays between two partitions of honest sealers when
t > 0. As an example, recall that Aura aims at tolerating up to
a minority d n2e−1 of malicious sealers, however, if a majorityb n2c+1 of sealers are sufficient to decide a block, then a group
of only 2 honest sealers helped with the t = b n2c+1 malicious
sealers would be sufficient to decide one block. This does
not prevent the other honest sealers in another partition from
deciding a conflicting block with the help of the clones of
the t malicious sealers. This is the reason why the dashed red
line on Figure 8 indicates that |V | ≥ b n+t2 c+1 is necessary to
guarantee that a majority of honest sealers sign a block so that
no other conflicting blocks can be decided. More precisely,
here are the 3 interesting cases to consider:
• Case t = 0. When all the sealers are honest, the algorithm
only needs at least a majority of sealers, |V | ≥ b n2c+1,
before considering that a block is decided.
• Case 0< t < n3 . To ensure that a majority of the honest
sealers seal a block for one block to be decided, we
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Figure 9: An Aura execution using |V |> 2n3 and t < n3 (n= 9,|V |= 7 and t = 2) where transaction TX1 is committed
need |V | ≥ b n+t2 c+ 1 sealers to seal blocks. As there
are n− t honest sealers, a majority of them contains
b n−t2 c+ 1 sealers. As there are t malicious sealers, we
need strictly more than half n−t2 of the honest sealers
and the t malicious ones to seal blocks, which leads to
|V | ≥ b n+t2 c+ 1. The two upper triangles of Figure 8
depict these conditions, under which Aura is safe.
• Case t ≥ n3 . Interestingly, when t ≥ n3 , it is impossible to
guarantee that at least |V | ≥ b n+t2 c+1 will seal blocks. In
fact, this would imply that strictly more than 2n3 sealers
seal a block. However, as t ≥ n3 this would also mean
that at least one malicious sealer seals a block, which
cannot be guaranteed as malicious sealers may choose,
by definition, to not follow the protocol. The upper-right
triangle of Figure 8 depicts the conditions under which
Aura is safe because |V | ≥ b n+t2 c+1 but not live because
t ≥ n3 .
Even with only one malicious sealer (t = 1), the current im-
plementation of Aura cannot guarantee safety. The reason is
that Aura claims that a majority of sealers is enough as long
as t ≤ n2 . However, one can find a counter-example where|V |= b n2c+1 that falls in the unsafe area shown in Figure 8.
10.3 Simple safe countermeasure
As explained in the introduction and for ethical reasons, we
disclosed early a simple, yet naive, countermeasure to make
Aura safe. This countermeasure has been implemented in the
xDai blockchain as acknowledged in their white paper [3].
This first countermeasure was not as precise as of today and
required |V |> 2n3 and t < n3 (our technical report is not cited
here for the sake of anonymity) to ensure safety but ignoring
liveness guarantees. Interestingly, the same conditions of this
countermeasure are required by IBFT [6] and recent work
suggested that IBFT is not live either [36].
S1 S3 S7 S9S5
S2 S6 S8S4
TX1
A decided
block
A sealed
block
Well-behaved
sealer
An empty
turnsealer
Malicious
...
S4
S7
A group of blocks
capable of finalizing the
first block in the group
TX2 ...
Figure 10: An Aura execution using |V | > 2n3 and t < n3
(n= 9, |V |= 7 and t = 2) where neither transaction TX1 nor
TX2 are committed
As an example, Figures 9 and 10 demonstrate how a modi-
fied version of Aura where n= 9, |V |= 7, t = 2 where S4 and
S7 and malicious. These two sealers are allowed to be silent
or even seal the blocks in all groups whenever a network parti-
tion occurs. As indicated with a green dash frame in Figure 9,
this version of Aura can commit TX1 even though S4 and S7
do not contribute any block to the chain in their turns. The S4
turn can be left empty and S5 may simply continue sealing a
block after that; the same goes for S8 after the end of S7 turn.
In this case, the other 7 honest sealers alone are sufficient to
decide a block. As indicated in the execution of Figure 10,
however, it is impossible to have at least 7 sealers on both
sides at the same time. Therefore, it is impossible to commit
the transactions issued to both partitions concurrently, even
though Aura allows their sealers to continue sealing more
blocks during the network partition.
10.4 Safe and live countermeasures
On Figure 8, it is easy to identify that the simple counter-
measure presented above, which requires |V |> 2n3 and t < n3 ,
does not ensure liveness. This is because it actually toler-
ates conditions in the upper-right triangle that do not ensure
liveness.
To remedy this issue, it is sufficient to ensure that n+t2 <|V | < n− t. Note that this implicitly guarantees that t < n3
anyway. As a result, under these conditions Aura remains safe
and live.
Finally, a radically different countermeasure that also of-
fers safety and liveness is to use a deterministic consensus
algorithm that is partially synchronous in that it tolerates ar-
bitrary delays. PBFT [5] is one example as it relies on a leader
but is not designed to scale outside a small network. DBFT [7]
is a leaderless deterministic partially synchronous consensus
algorithm that was especially designed to scale to blockchain
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systems. In addition, DBFT is time optimal and resilience
optimal. It has been shown that DBFT is resilient to double
spending attacks, as it is not possible for a blockchain building
upon it, like the Red Belly Blockchain [38], to fork.
11 Conclusion
To cope with the drawbacks of proof-of-work, Byzantine fault
tolerance has been introduced in mainstream blockchains in
the form of proof-of-authority where sufficient sealers |V |
among n must seal a block despite a minority t of them being
malicious. The Cloning Attack allows malicious participants
to double spend in Ethereum instances using Clique and Aura
consensus protocols. Our findings inspired by the theory of
Byzantine fault tolerance define precisely the necessary and
sufficient condition n+t2 < |V |< n−t under which PoA is safe
and live. The Cloning Attack consists of duplicating private
keys for cloning and require that the network messages are
delayed. We explained how to gather the necessary topolo-
gical information to identify how to attack the underlying
network of some of these blockchains.
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